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Abstract—This paper investigates ordering and pricing de-
cisions in a closed-loop supply chain with fuzzy demand. In
this paper, the market demand is characterized as a fuzzy
variable and two settings, decentralized channel and central-
ized channel, are considered. Based on game theory and fuzzy
theory, the optimal ordering decision and the optimal recovery
prices are given for each setting. The factors that impact the
optimal ordering decision and the optimal recovery prices are
also found. Some characteristics of the optimal decisions are
discussed from the view of management.
Keywords-supply chain management; closed-loop supply
chain; ordering; pricing; fuzzy demand
I. INTRODUCTION
Closed loop supply chain (CLSC) has gained an extensive
importance today. A CLSC consists of both the forward
supply chain, and the reverse supply chain. The forward
supply chain essentially involves the movement of products
from the upstream suppliers to the downstream customers.
The reverse supply chain involves the movement of used
products from the customer to the upstream supply chain [1].
Over the past decades, CLSC has become a critical research
topic in operations research and management area. Many
analytical and quantitative approaches can be found in vari-
ous problems about CLSC, such as production planning [2],
inventory control [3], supply chain network design [4], and
so on.
There also has been a lot of research work concerned on
ordering and pricing decisions in CLSC. Mitra [5] deter-
mined the optimal prices when the availability of discarded
products, price and quality affect the demand of remanufac-
tured products. Guide et al. [6] determined the optimal prod-
uct acquisition price and remanufactured product sale prices
when an original equipment manufacturer inﬂuences the
quality, quantity, and timing of product returns via quality-
dependent price incentives. Vadde et al. [7] considered
pricing decisions in a multi-criteria environment for product
recovery facilities. Bakal and Akcali [8] investigated a pric-
ing optimization problem for an auto-motive dismantling and
parts remanufacturing ﬁrm which has the power to determine
the acquisition price of the end-of-life vehicles (ELVs) and
the selling price of remanufactured parts. Both the supply
quantity of ELVs and the demand of remanufactured parts
are assumed to be linear price-sensitive, and mathematical
models to optimize the two prices are developed. These
research made great contributions to the management of
CLSC. However, most of the existing literature investigated
the subject in deterministic environment or in stochastic
environment. In order to make effective supply chain strate-
gies, we cannot ignore the uncertainties that happen in the
real world. In many cases, probability distributions of some
random variables are difﬁcult or impossible to obtain with
lack of historical data. Some uncertainties have to be given
or estimated by the experts based on their experiences and
judgements. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that these
uncertainties are fuzzy variables. However, there is still no
research on ordering and pricing decisions for a closed-loop
supply chain in fuzzy environment.
To overcome this limitation, this paper investigates the
optimal ordering and pricing decisions in a closed-loop
supply chain with fuzzy demand. First we derive the op-
timal decisions for a decentralized channel. In the decen-
tralized channel, the manufacturer and the retailer work
independently. The problem is described as a two-echelon
manufacturer-Stg process. Then the model is extended to
the centralized channel case. In the centralized channel,
the manufacturer and the retailer make cooperation, which
can also be regarded as an integrated-ﬁrm. Based on game
theory and fuzzy theory, the optimal ordering decision and
the optimal recovery prices are given for each setting. The
factors that impact the optimal ordering decision and the
optimal recovery prices are founded. Some characteristics of
the optimal decisions are discussed from the view of man-
agement. Our main contribution is to develop the optimal
decisions in the CLSC with fuzzy demand. The purpose of
describing the demand as a fuzzy variable is to contribute
new insight into decision making in CLSC.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Relevant
preliminaries are reviewed in Section II. Problem statement
is presented in Section III. Main conclusions on supply chain
models with fuzzy demand are given in Section IV. Section
V concludes this paper.
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II. PRELIMINARIES
Deﬁnition 2.1 [9] Let 𝜉 be a fuzzy variable. The expected
value of 𝜉 is deﬁned by
𝐸(𝜉) =
𝐸∗(𝜉) + 𝐸∗(𝜉)
2
=
∫ 1
0
𝑑1(𝜆) + 𝑑2(𝜆)
2
𝑑𝜆
where [𝐸∗(𝜉), 𝐸∗(𝜉)] is the interval-valued expectation,
and [𝑑1(𝜆), 𝑑2(𝜆)] is the 𝜆-level set of 𝜉.
Proposition 2.1 For linear operations of closed interval,
by classical extension principle, we have the following
conclusions:
(𝑎) [𝑎, 𝑏] + [𝑐, 𝑑] = [𝑎+ 𝑐, 𝑏+ 𝑑];
(𝑏) 𝛼[𝑎, 𝑏] = [𝛼𝑎, 𝛼𝑏] if 𝛼 ≥ 0, 𝛼 ∈ 𝑅;
(𝑐) 𝛼[𝑎, 𝑏] = [𝛼𝑏, 𝛼𝑎] if 𝛼 < 0, 𝛼 ∈ 𝑅.
Proposition 2.2 [10] The triangular fuzzy number 𝜉 =
(𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐) as shown in Figure 1 can be described by the
following membership function 𝜇𝜉(𝑥)
𝜇𝜉(𝑥) =
⎧⎨
⎩
𝐿(𝑥) if 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏
𝑅(𝑥) if 𝑏 < 𝑥 ≤ 𝑐
0 else
where 𝐿(𝑥) and 𝑅(𝑥) are the increasing and decreasing
continuous functions, respectively. The 𝜆-level set of ?˜? can
be denoted as 𝐷𝜆=[𝐿−1(𝜆), 𝑅−1(𝜆)], 𝜆 ∈ [0, 1], which is a
closed interval on real number set 𝑅.
( )L x ( )R x
?
( )x??
a b c0
1
Figure 1: The membership function of 𝜉
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain consisting
of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer engages in the
collection of used products. In the forward supply chain,
the manufacturer wholesales a product to the retailer, who
in turn retails it to the customer. In the reverse supply chain,
the retailer buys a used product from the customer, then sales
it to the manufacturer for remanufacturing. In this paper, we
assume that there is no distinction between a remanufactured
and a manufactured product and the demand is a triangular
fuzzy number, i.e., ?˜? = (𝑑𝐿, 𝑑𝑀 , 𝑑𝑅). The problem can be
described as Figure 2.
w p
tpmp
Manufacturer Retailer
Forward supply chain Reverse supply chain
Figure 2: Illustration of ﬂow in a closed-loop supply chain
The following notations are used throughout this paper.
𝑤 Unit wholesale price,
𝑝 Unit retail price,
𝑝𝑚 Unit price of a used product from the retailer
to the manufacturer (decision variable)
𝑝𝑟 Unit price of a used product from the customer
to the retailer (decision variable)
𝑝𝑠 Unit price of a used product from the customer
to the manufacturer (decision variable)
𝑄𝑑 Retailer’s order quantity in the decentralized
channel (decision variable)
𝑄𝑠 Retailer’s order quantity in the centralized
channel (decision variable)
?¯? The amount of used products collected from
customers
𝑐𝑛 Unit cost of manufacturing of original products
𝑐𝑟 Unit cost of remanufacturing
𝑠 Retailer’s unit salvage value
𝑢 Retailer’s unit shortage value
𝛼 Remanufacturing rate (0 ≤ 𝛼 < 1)
𝑟 Maginal proﬁt rate for collecting used products
𝑟 = 𝑝𝑚−𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚 (0 ≤ 𝑟 < 1)
?˜? Demand for the new product in the market
In this paper, we assume that ?¯? takes on the exponential
form,i.e., ?¯? = 𝑏𝑝𝑘𝑟 , where 𝑏 is a constant and 𝑘 denotes the
elasticity of the price.
IV. SUPPLY CHAIN MODELS WITH REMANUFACTURING
In this section, two settings are considered: decentralized
channel and centralized channel.
A. Decentralized Channel
In the decentralized channel, the manufacturer and the
retailer act to maximize their individual proﬁts. In this case, a
Stackelberg game occurs between them. We assume that the
manufacturer behaving as a Stackelberg leader dominates the
CLSC, and the retailer is a follower. The retailer’s problem
and the manufacturer’s problem are as follows:
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1) Retailer’s problem: If the quantity that the retailer
orders is 𝑄𝑑, the sales volume, holding and shortage quantity
for the retailer can be denoted as min{𝑄𝑑, ?˜?}, max{𝑄𝑑 −
?˜?, 0} and max{?˜? −𝑄𝑑, 0} respectively. Consequently, the
total proﬁt for the retailer can be expressed as follows:
𝜋𝑟 = 𝑝min{𝑄𝑑, ?˜?}+ 𝑠max{𝑄𝑑 − ?˜?, 0}
− 𝑢max{?˜? −𝑄𝑑, 0} − 𝑤𝑄𝑑 + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟). (1)
In this paper, we assume that 𝑝 is decided by the market.
Thus, for given 𝑤 and 𝑝𝑚, the retailer’s decision problem
is to ﬁnd 𝑄𝑑 and 𝑝𝑟 to maximize 𝐸(𝜋𝑟), which can be
expressed as
max
𝑄𝑑,𝑝𝑟
𝐸[𝜋𝑟]. (2)
For this optimal problem, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 1 In the decentralized channel, for
given 𝑤 and 𝑝𝑚, the optimal 𝑄𝑑 is as follows:
𝑄∗𝑑 =
{
𝐿−1[ 2(𝑝+𝑢−𝑤)𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 ], if 𝑝+ 𝑢 ≤ 2𝑤 − 𝑠
𝑅−1[ 2(𝑤−𝑠)𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 ], if 𝑝+ 𝑢 > 2𝑤 − 𝑠
Proof: We discuss this optimal problem by the
following two cases.
(1) Case 1 𝑑𝐿 ≤ 𝑄𝑑 ≤ 𝑑𝑀
(min {𝑄𝑑, ?˜?})𝜆 =
{
[𝐿−1(𝜆), 𝑄𝑑], 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
[𝑄𝑑, 𝑄𝑑], 𝐿(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
(max {𝑄𝑑−?˜?, 0})𝜆 =
{
[0, 𝑄𝑑 − 𝐿−1(𝜆)], 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
[0, 0], 𝐿(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
(min {?˜?−𝑄𝑑, 0})𝜆 =
⎧⎨
⎩
[0, 𝑅−1(𝜆)−𝑄𝑑], 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
[𝐿−1(𝜆)−𝑄𝑑, 𝑅−1(𝜆)−𝑄𝑑],
𝐿(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
According to proposition 2.1, we know
if 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
(𝜋𝑟)𝜆 = [𝑝𝐿
−1(𝜆)− 𝑢𝑅−1(𝜆) + (𝑢− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟),
− 𝑠𝐿−1(𝜆) + (𝑝+ 𝑠− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟)]
(3)
if 𝐿(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
(𝜋𝑟)𝜆 = [(𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 − 𝑢𝑅−1(𝜆) + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟),
(𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 − 𝑢𝐿−1(𝜆) + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟)]
(4)
According to deﬁnition 2.1, we get
𝐸(𝜋𝑟) =
1
2
∫ 𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
0
[(𝑝− 𝑠)𝐿−1(𝜆)− 𝑢𝑅−1(𝜆)]𝑑𝜆
− 12
∫ 1
𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
𝑢[𝐿−1(𝜆) +𝑅−1(𝜆)]𝑑𝜆
+ 12 (𝑠− 𝑝− 𝑢)𝑄𝑑𝐿(𝑄𝑑) + (𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑
+ ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟)
(5)
The ﬁrst and second derivatives of the retailer’s expected
proﬁt 𝐸(𝜋𝑟) with respect to 𝑄𝑑, respectively, are
𝑑𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑄𝑑
=
1
2
(𝑠− 𝑝− 𝑢)𝐿(𝑄𝑑) + (𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑤)
and
𝑑2𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑄2𝑑
=
1
2
𝑑𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
𝑑𝑄𝑑
(𝑠− 𝑝− 𝑢),
where 𝐿(𝑄𝑑) is an increasing function of 𝑄𝑑, which means
that 𝑑𝐿(𝑄𝑑)𝑑𝑄𝑑 > 0. Since 𝑠 < 𝑝, we get
𝑑2𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑄2
𝑑
< 0. In this
case, we can conclude that 𝐸(𝜋𝑟) is concave with respect
to 𝑄𝑑. By setting 𝑑𝐸(𝜋𝑟)𝑑𝑄𝑑 to zero, we get 𝐿[𝑄𝑑] =
2(𝑝+𝑢−𝑤)
𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 .
It is obvious that 2(𝑝+𝑢−𝑤)𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 > 0. Thus, when
2(𝑝+𝑢−𝑤)
𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 <
1, that is 𝑝 + 𝑢 ≤ 2𝑤 − 𝑠, we can determine the proﬁt-
maximizing 𝑄∗𝑑 as follows:
𝑄∗𝑑 = 𝐿
−1[
2(𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑤)
𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑠 ]. (6)
(2) Case 2 𝑑𝑀 ≤ 𝑄𝑑 ≤ 𝑑𝑅
(min {𝑄𝑑, ?˜?})𝜆 =
{
[𝐿−1(𝜆), 𝑄𝑑], 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑅(𝑄𝑑)
[𝐿−1(𝜆), 𝑅−1(𝜆)], 𝑅(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
(max {𝑄𝑑−?˜?, 0})𝜆 =
⎧⎨
⎩
[0, 𝑄𝑑 − 𝐿−1(𝜆)], 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑅(𝑄𝑑)
[𝑄𝑑 −𝑅−1(𝜆), 𝑄𝑑 − 𝐿−1(𝜆)],
𝑅(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
(min {?˜?−𝑄𝑑, 0})𝜆 =
{
[0, 𝑅−1(𝜆)−𝑄𝑑], 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑅(𝑄𝑑)
[0, 0], 𝑅(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
According to proposition 2.1, we get
if 0 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑅(𝑄𝑑)
(𝜋𝑟)𝜆 = [𝑝𝐿
−1(𝜆)− 𝑢𝑅−1(𝜆) + (𝑢− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟),
(𝑝+ 𝑠− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 − 𝑠𝐿−1(𝜆) + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟)]
(7)
if 𝑅(𝑄𝑑) < 𝜆 ≤ 1
(𝜋𝑟)𝜆 = [𝑝𝐿
−1(𝜆)− 𝑠𝑅−1(𝜆) + (𝑠− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟),
𝑝𝑅−1(𝜆)− 𝑠𝐿−1(𝜆) + (𝑠− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑 + ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟)]
(8)
Then, according to deﬁnition 2.1, we get
𝐸(𝜋𝑟) =
1
2
∫ 1
0
[(𝑝− 𝑠)𝐿−1(𝜆)]𝑑𝜆 −
∫ 𝑅(𝑄𝑑)
0
[𝑢𝑅−1(𝜆)]𝑑𝜆
+
∫ 1
𝑅(𝑄𝑑)
[(𝑝− 𝑠)𝑅−1(𝜆)]𝑑𝜆
+ 12 (𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑠)𝑄𝑑𝑅(𝑄𝑑) + (𝑠− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑
+ ?¯?(𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝𝑟).
(9)
The ﬁrst and second derivatives of the retailer’s expected
proﬁt 𝐸(𝜋𝑟) with respect to 𝑄𝑑, respectively, are
𝑑𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑄𝑑
=
1
2
(𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑠)𝑅(𝑄𝑑) + (𝑠− 𝑤)
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and
𝑑2𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑄2𝑑
=
1
2
𝑑𝑅(𝑄𝑑)
𝑑𝑄𝑑
(𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑠),
where 𝑅(𝑄𝑑) is a decreasing function of 𝑄𝑑, which means
that 𝑑𝑅(𝑄𝑑)𝑑𝑄𝑑 < 0. Since 𝑝 > 𝑠, we get
𝑑2𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑄2
𝑑
< 0.
Thus, 𝐸(𝜋𝑟) is concave with respect to 𝑄𝑑. In the following,
let 𝑑𝐸(𝜋𝑟)𝑑𝑄𝑑 be zero, and its solution is 𝑅(𝑄𝑑) =
2(𝑤−𝑠)
𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 .
Since 𝑤 > 𝑠, we know that 2(𝑤−𝑠)𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 > 0. Thus, if
2(𝑤−𝑠)
𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 <
1, that is 𝑝 + 𝑢 ≥ 2𝑤 − 𝑠, we can determine the proﬁt-
maximizing 𝑄∗𝑑 as follows:
𝑄∗𝑑 = 𝑅
−1[
2(𝑤 − 𝑠)
𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑠 ]. (10)
So far, we have completed Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 In the decentralized channel, the optimal unit
recovery price to the retailer is as follows:
𝑝∗𝑟 =
𝑘
1 + 𝑘
𝑝𝑚.
The marginal proﬁt ratio to retailer for collecting used
products from customers is a decreasing function of 𝑘.
Proof: Since 𝑟 = 𝑝𝑚−𝑝𝑟𝑝𝑚 , 𝐸(𝜋𝑟) can be rewritten as
follows:
𝐸(𝜋𝑟) =
1
2
∫ 𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
0
[(𝑝− 𝑠)𝐿−1(𝜆)− 𝑢𝑅−1(𝜆)]𝑑𝜆
− 12
∫ 1
𝐿(𝑄𝑑)
𝑢[𝐿−1(𝜆) +𝑅−1(𝜆)]𝑑𝜆
+ 12 (𝑠− 𝑝− 𝑢)𝑄𝑑𝐿(𝑄𝑑) + (𝑝+ 𝑢− 𝑤)𝑄𝑑
+ 𝑏𝑝𝑘+1𝑚 𝑟(1− 𝑟)𝑘. (11)
The ﬁrst and second derivatives of the retailer’s expected
proﬁt 𝐸(𝜋𝑟) with respect to 𝑟, respectively, are
𝑑𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑟
= 𝑏𝑝𝑘+1𝑚 [(1− 𝑟)𝑘 + 𝑟𝑘(1− 𝑟)𝑘−1]
and
𝑑2𝐸(𝜋𝑟)
𝑑𝑟2
= −(𝑘 − 1)𝑟(1− 𝑟)𝑘−2.
Since 𝑘 > 1, 𝑟 ≤ 1, we get 𝑑2𝐸(𝜋𝑟)𝑑𝑟2 < 0. In this case,
we conclude that 𝐸(𝜋𝑟) is concave with respect to 𝑟. By
setting 𝑑𝐸(𝜋𝑟)𝑑𝑟 to zero, namely 𝑏𝑝
𝑘+1
𝑚 [(1 − 𝑟)𝑘−1(1 − 𝑟 +
𝑟𝑘)] = 0, and we get its solution
𝑟 =
1
1 + 𝑘
. (12)
Obviously, 𝑟 is a decreasing function of 𝑘. From (12), we
obtain
𝑝∗𝑟 =
𝑘
1 + 𝑘
𝑝𝑚.
2) Manufacturer’s problem: The total proﬁt for the man-
ufacturer can be expressed as follows:
𝜋𝑚 = (𝑤 − 𝑐𝑛)𝑄𝑑 + (𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟)𝛼?¯?− 𝑝𝑚?¯?. (13)
In this paper, we assume that 𝑤 is exogenous. Thus,
the manufacturer’s decision problem is to ﬁnd 𝑝𝑚 to
maximize 𝐸(𝜋𝑚), which can be expressed as
max
𝑝𝑚
𝐸[𝜋𝑚]. (14)
For this optimal problem, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 In the decentralized channel, the optimal unit
recovery price to manufacturer is as follows:
𝑝∗𝑚 =
𝛼𝑘(𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟)
𝑘 + 1
.
The optimal recovery price is an increasing function of (𝑐𝑛−
𝑐𝑟).
Proof: The ﬁrst and second derivatives of the manu-
facturer’s proﬁt 𝜋𝑚 with respect to 𝑝𝑚, respectively, are
𝑑𝜋𝑚
𝑑𝑝𝑚
= 𝑏(1− 𝑟)𝑘𝑝𝑘−1𝑚 [𝛼𝑘(𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟)− (𝑘 + 1)𝑝𝑚]
and
𝑑2𝜋𝑚
𝑑𝑝2𝑚
= 𝑘𝑏(1− 𝑟)𝑘𝑝𝑘−2𝑚 [𝛼(𝑘 − 1)(𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟)− (𝑘 + 1)𝑝𝑚].
Since 𝛼(𝑘 − 1)(𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟) − (𝑘 + 1)𝑝𝑚 ≤ 𝛼(𝑘 − 1)𝑝𝑚 −
(𝑘 + 1)𝑝𝑚 < 0, we get 𝑑
2𝜋𝑚
𝑑𝑝2𝑚
< 0, which means that 𝜋𝑚 is
concave with respect to 𝑝𝑚. By setting 𝑑𝜋𝑚𝑑𝑝𝑚 to zero, we
get 𝑝∗𝑚 =
𝛼𝑘(𝑐𝑛−𝑐𝑟)
𝑘+1 .
B. Centralized Channel
In the centralized channel, the manufacturer and the re-
tailer cooperate with each other and behave as an integrated-
ﬁrm. The total proﬁt for the system can be expressed as
follows:
𝜋𝑠 = 𝑝min{𝑄𝑠, ?˜?}+ 𝑠max{𝑄𝑠 − ?˜?, 0}
− 𝑢max{?˜? −𝑄𝑠, 0} − 𝑐𝑛𝑄𝑠 + 𝛼?¯?(𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟)− 𝑝𝑠?¯?.
(15)
The problem for the system is to ﬁnd 𝑄𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠 to
maximize 𝐸(𝜋𝑠), which can be expressed as
max
𝑝𝑠
𝐸(𝜋𝑠). (16)
For this optimal problem, we have the following theorems.
Theorem 4 In the centralized channel, the optimal produc-
tion 𝑄𝑠 and the optimal unit recovery price 𝑝𝑠 are as follows:
𝑄∗𝑠 =
{
𝐿−1[ 2(𝑝+𝑢−𝑐𝑛)𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 ], if 𝑝+ 𝑢 ≤ 2𝑐𝑛 − 𝑠
𝑅−1[ 2(𝑐𝑛−𝑠)𝑝+𝑢−𝑠 ], if 𝑝+ 𝑢 > 2𝑐𝑛 − 𝑠
,
𝑝∗𝑠 =
𝛼𝑘(𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟)
𝑘 + 1
.
The proof is similar to Theorem 1.
Theorem 5 In the centralized channel, the optimal 𝑝𝑠 is
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an increasing function with respect to 𝑘, 𝛼 and (𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟),
respectively.
Proof: As mentioned in Theorem 4, 𝑝∗𝑠 = 𝛼𝑘(𝑐𝑛−𝑐𝑟)𝑘+1 .
It is clear that 𝑝∗𝑠 is an increasing function with respect
to 𝛼 and (𝑐𝑛 − 𝑐𝑟), respectively. Since 𝑝∗𝑠 = 𝛼𝑘(𝑐𝑛−𝑐𝑟)𝑘+1 =
𝛼(𝑐𝑛−𝑐𝑟)−𝛼(𝑐𝑛−𝑐𝑟)𝑘+1 , we can observe that 𝑝∗𝑠 is an increasing
function of 𝑘.
C. Numerical example
In order to illustrate our model, let us consider the case
that the fuzzy demand ?˜? = (450, 500, 600), 𝑝 = 8, 𝑤 =
5, 𝑠 = 2, 𝑢 = 1, 𝑐𝑛 = 4, 𝑐𝑟 = 2.5, 𝛼 = 0.7, 𝑘 = 1.5, 𝑏 = 2.
By Theorem 1, we can get the retailer’s optimal order quan-
tity in the decentralized channel 𝑄∗𝑑 = 514. By Theorem
2, we can get the the optimal unit recovery price to the
retailer 𝑝∗𝑟 = 0.252. By Theorem 3, we can get the the op-
timal unit recovery price to the manufacturer 𝑝∗𝑚 = 0.42. By
Theorem 4, we can get the the optimal order quantity in the
centralized channel 𝑄∗𝑠 = 542 and the optimal unit recovery
price 𝑝𝑠 = 0.63.
The comparision and the detailed analysis of the results
in the two settings will be reported in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the problem associated with ordering and
pricing decisions in a closed-loop with fuzzy demand has
been investigated for two settings: decentralized channel and
centralized channel. By using game theory and fuzzy theory,
we have derived the optimal ordering decision and the opti-
mal pricing decisions. From the optimal decisions, we have
observed that: (1) the unit recovery price from the customer
to the retailer is related to the remanufacturing rate 𝛼, the
elasticity of the price 𝑘, and the difference of the unit cost
of manufacturing of original products 𝑐𝑛 and the unit cost of
remanufacturing 𝑐𝑟, no matter in the decentralized channel
or in the centralized channel; (2) the marginal proﬁt rate 𝑟 for
collecting used products to the retailer in the decentralized
channel is related to the elasticity of the price 𝑘.
It is worth pointing out that there are other uncertainties
in systems, such as the quantity of returned used products
and the remanufacturing rate. The problem associated with
ordering and pricing decisions in a closed-loop supply chain
with these kinds of uncertainties can become a new topic in
further research, and we also can extend the result of this
paper to the scene that contains multi-retailers.
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